Opinion: Reflections on Afghanistan

BAGRAM, Afghanistan – Back in the States, there has been no shortage of analysts, politicos and pundits who have voiced an opinion about the continuing war against terrorism on its most active and public front here in Afghanistan. Some of those viewpoints are accurate, some have been made strictly to score political points, and still others are cogent in their thought and scrutiny, if not their accuracy.

At its core, the United States – even after spending nine years here – is still focused on the same primary objective that led then-President George W. Bush and the Congress to send American forces here in the days immediately following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks: Root out and destroy Islamo-centric terrorist factions and their allies. Destroyed or dispersed in our initial onslaught, elements of the al Qaeda network, founded by Osama bin Laden, and Taliban sympathizers have since joined together to combat U.S. and coalition forces.

The objective stated by the Bush administration has been echoed by the current administration of President Obama – to continue to deny terrorist factions the ability to use Afghanistan the plan and execute future terrorist strikes against the U.S. and other Western targets. So, the goal was, and remains, fundamentally sound.

It’s the manner in which U.S. and coalition forces are being asked to pursue that goal that has left some analysts rightfully critical.

To be sure, this conflict is unique in that, while truly global in nature, it is different from previous wars because of its unconventional, asymmetric and fluid nature. There are no “fronts” as we have come to know them; and while Afghanistan itself is often referred to as the “front line” in the war against terror, that, too, is a misnomer because even here, there are no front lines – only the occasional pitched battles heavily supplemented by small arms ambushes and improvised explosive devices. Classic guerilla warfare, in other words, with the “guerillas” played by extremist Muslim adherents of militant Islam, often complete with the support of local population bases.

Such characteristics make the conflict, as Bush warned in the days after 9/11, one that is likely to last for years – and certainly much longer than the average American news cycle. Part of that is because of the nature of the enemy’s tactics; part of it is because we are operating on a learning curve. The fact is, brilliant learned tactical military minds have studied the nature of the conflict here, in great depth; but the enemy isn’t static, and is constantly changing his tactics in response to our own. That makes for an ongoing cycle of action and reaction, but we are at least learning about fighting such conflicts in the process.

The stickler here has been getting the Afghan population on board with our goals and objectives. U.S. forces are met with indifference and even suspicion from populations that do not universally share our goals, and that actually work against us for their own benefit in many instances. Few seem to have little interest in, or use for, their own central government, for the reason that it simply does not represent their interests and perhaps never will. That and the tribal, localized nature of the Afghan people make them innately distrustful of a central government.

In response, the Pentagon has made it a primary objective to “win the hearts and minds” of the Afghan population or, at a minimum, have U.S. and Coalition forces do as little as possible to alienate the population and drive it towards the enemy. While such a policy makes for good sound bites on the evening news, the fact is such a strategy has turned into less a military objective than a lofty, moral pursuit. The reality is it will take decades to change the cultural mindset of a population as tribal as it is here, if ever.

So what is the alternative?

Simply packing up at this point and going home may not be the best option, as some have suggested. Because while the U.S. has at least been successful in destroying the Taliban and al Qaeda power base within Afghanistan, we have also succeeded in driving the Islamic extremist insurgency in this part of the world east, to friendly environs in neighboring Pakistan – a nuclear-armed country whose political and military leadership is at least deferential to our terrorist enemies, if not outright supportive of and friendly to them. To simply leave Afghanistan to its own devices at this point would be to surely invite a hostile Taliban regime to retake power here – one that could again offer support and sanctuary for Islamic terrorists. Pakistan would support such a move because it would serve its interests in keeping archenemy India off-balance.

Allowed free rein, it’s obvious what terrorist organizations like al Qaeda are capable of. In Yemen, for example, the United States and the government of that Middle East nation have teamed, of sorts, to combat an al Qaeda element that has surfaced there. For the U.S., the assistance as come largely in the form of boosting financial aid from less than $11 million in 2006 to $70 million in 2009. With U.S. backing, Yemen is making progress; al Qaeda has long used the peninsula’s remote mountains and deserts to operate, train and plan.

Ramping up the pressure against al Qaeda is the only way to keep the organization off-balance, on the run and, hence, ineffective. Adding forces to Afghanistan, as President Obama ordered earlier this year, will only help achieve that goal if those forces are allowed to be something other than targets.

Eventually, however, the U.S. will have to do what it is currently doing in Iraq – hand off the majority of the country’s security to local forces, while perhaps maintaining a much-reduced military presence responsible for continuing to train Afghan military and security personnel and to keep a finger on the pulse of Islamic insurgency in this part of the world. What must happen first is the creation of conditions where the U.S. has all but crushed opposition, allowing Afghan forces to step up effectively, as happened in Iraq in 2007-08. The current surge in American forces is designed to create just such conditions.

The Obama White House says its goal in Afghanistan is the same as that of the prior Bush administration – “to disrupt, dismantle and eventually defeat al Qaeda and prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.” For his part, Gen. David Petraeus, who now commands the Afghan theater, says current U.S. strategy is “fundamentally sound,” noting he has seen signs of progress, especially in the volatile south, “in new initiatives to create community defense forces and in nascent steps to reintegrate low-level insurgents who want to stop fighting,” The Washington Post reported last week.

In the meantime, Petraeus should be given the opportunity to implement any changes he is contemplating and the public should be educated to those goals and be given a realistic timeline for results.

Fighting terrorism is more than just a noble objective or moral imperative. In terms of what is at stake – the sanctity and security of Western civilization – it is an effort that requires the same eternal vigilance that it takes to maintain freedom and prosperity.